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THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS (THE “INTERESTS”) IN GRW 
MEZZANINE FUND I LP (THE “FUND”) ARE OFFERED EXCLUSIVELY TO “ELIGIBLE 
INVESTORS” AS DEFINED HEREIN.  
  
THE INTERESTS ARE A HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, ENTIRELY ILLIQUID AND 
CONCENTRATED INVESTMENT, INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL RISK, AND ARE A SUITABLE 
INVESTMENT ONLY FOR A LIMITED PORTION OF THE RISK SEGMENT OF AN 
INVESTOR’S PORTFOLIO. SUBSCRIBERS COULD LOSE ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY 
ALL OF THEIR INVESTMENT IN THE FUND.  
  
THE INTERESTS ARE PRIVATELY OFFERED.  
 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS MAY BE DRAWN DOWN FROM INVESTORS ON 
THE CLOSING DATE OF THEIR INVESTMENT AND THEREAFTER THROUGH THE END 
OF THE DRAW PERIOD (AS DEFINED HEREIN).  
 
NO PERSON HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS 
CONCERNING THE FUND OR OFFERING OF THE INTERESTS OTHER THAN THOSE 
CONTAINED IN THIS MEMORANDUM OR IN THE PUBLIC FILINGS OF THE FUND 
UNDER THE 1940 ACT. WHEN MAKING AN INVESTMENT DECISION, THE OFFEREE 
MUST RELY ON ITS OWN EXAMINATION OF THE FUND AND THE TERMS OF THIS 
OFFERING, INCLUDING THE MERITS AND RISKS INVOLVED. THE OFFEREE IS 
REQUIRED TO REPRESENT THAT THE OFFEREE HAS SUBSCRIBED FOR AN 
INTEREST SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THIS 
MEMORANDUM OR IN THE PUBLIC FILINGS OF THE FUND UNDER THE 1940 ACT.  
 
THE CONTENTS OF THIS MEMORANDUM SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS 
INVESTMENT, LEGAL OR TAX ADVICE. THE OFFEREE IS URGED TO SEEK 
INDEPENDENT INVESTMENT, LEGAL AND TAX ADVICE CONCERNING THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF INVESTING IN THE FUND.  
 
THE OFFEREE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER INVESTING IN THE FUND UNLESS 
THE OFFEREE IS EITHER ALONE OR TOGETHER WITH THE OFFEREE’S 
PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS, FINANCIALLY SOPHISTICATED AND CAPABLE OF 
EVALUATING THE RISKS, ILLIQUIDITY, VALUATION UNCERTAINTY, TAX 
CONSEQUENCES AND POTENTIAL MERITS OF SUCH INVESTMENT.  
 
THE OFFEREE, BY ACCEPTING RECEIPT OF THIS MEMORANDUM, AGREES 
TO TREAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN AS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT TO 
DUPLICATE THIS MEMORANDUM OR FURNISH COPIES OF IT TO ANY PERSON 
OTHER THAN SUCH OFFEREE’S PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS. THE OFFEREE 
FURTHER AGREES PROMPTLY TO DISPOSE OF THIS MEMORANDUM SHOULD THE 
OFFEREE DECIDE NOT TO INVEST.  
 
 




SECURITIES LAW NOTICES 
 
 
NOTICE TO ALL PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS 
 
THE INTERESTS OFFERED PURSUANT TO THIS MEMORANDUM HAVE NOT BEEN 
REGISTERED WITH OR APPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
OR ANY STATE SECURITIES AGENCY. FURTHERMORE, NONE OF THE FOREGOING 
AUTHORITIES HAS CONFIRMED THE ACCURACY OR DETERMINED THE ADEQUACY OF 
THIS DOCUMENT. TO REPRESENT ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL 
OFFENSE. THIS IS A PRIVATE OFFERING MADE ONLY PURSUANT TO EXEMPTIONS 
PROVIDED BY RULE 506 UNDER SECTION 4(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS 
AMENDED (THE “SECURITIES ACT”).  
 
THIS MEMORANDUM SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR A 
SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY, NOR SHALL THERE BE ANY OFFER, 
SOLICITATION OR SALE OF THE INTERESTS IN ANY JURISDICTION IN WHICH SUCH 
OFFER, SOLICITATION OR SALE IS NOT AUTHORIZED OR TO ANY PERSON TO WHOM IT 
IS UNLAWFUL TO MAKE ANY SUCH OFFER, SOLICITATION OR SALE.  
 
THE INTERESTS ARE NOT REDEEMABLE, AND THERE IS NO SECONDARY 
MARKET FOR THE INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, INTERESTS MAY NOT BE TRANSFERRED 
WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF DECLARATION, WHICH WILL BE 
GRANTED IF THE TRANSFEREE IS AN ELIGIBLE INVESTOR, THE TRANSFER IS 
PERMITTED UNDER APPLICABLE SECURITIES LAW RESTRICTIONS AND THE TRANSFER 
WILL NOT RESULT IN THE FUND CONSTITUTING A PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIP 
FOR TAX PURPOSES.  
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Overview This Private Placement Memorandum (“PPM”) is being 
provided in order to solicit interest from qualified 
investors for investment in mezzanine financing 
opportunities in commercial real estate in the 
metropolitan Washington area. 
 
The following is only a summary of the investment 
fund and its sponsor.  Interested investors are 
required to read the PPM in its entirety as well as the 
draft Amended and Restated Limited Partnership 




The Fund GRW Mezzanine Fund I LP (the “Fund”) is a recently 
formed Delaware Limited Partnership that is exempt 
from registration under Regulation D (private 
placement exemption) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
 
The Fund seeks to raise up to $150,000,000 in limited 
partnership interests in order to issue new mezzanine 
debt to select borrowers with the objective of 
generating returns for investors of at least 14%.  
There is no guarantee that the investment will 
generate any return or return the initial capital 
investment. 
 
Participating investors will purchase limited 
partnership interests in the Fund, and as limited 
partners, will indirectly own debt which is issued to 
selected borrowers (see “Specified Properties”).  
Investors will be admitted to the Fund through 
execution of individual Subscription Agreements and 
of the master LPA. 
 
The Advisory  
Committee The Advisory Committee (the “Committee”) of the 
Fund has overall responsibility to oversee the 
business operations of the Fund on behalf of the 
Limited Partners.  Biographies for the Committee 
Members are included in Section IV, Fund 
Management. 
 
The Sponsor The General Partner of the Fund, GRW Mezz GP LLC 
(“Sponsor”) is a single asset entity whose members 
are GRW Funds, Inc. (“GRW”) and Fox Realty Mezz 









GRW is the managing member of the Sponsor and is 
a closely held corporation, which is owned 100% by G. 
Reid Weppler. 
 
Fox Realty Mezz Investments L.P.  is an affiliated 
company of Fox Realty Trust, a fully integrated Real 
Estate Investment Trust and a member of the S&P 
500. 
 
As detailed in Section II, Investment Strategy (see 
Sponsor Approach), FRM is involved solely for its 
guarantor capacity in a) the event that the Sponsor 
must step-in-the-shoes of a borrower to which it has 
loaned funds (see Section VII, Certain Risks) and b) 
as necessary to obtain a Fund level loan to bridge 
investor’s proceeds.  GRW will work with the 
Committee on behalf of the Fund to make all 
management decisions. GRW is responsible for all 
investments and business development and is the 
contact for investors.  Mr. Weppler has 10 years of 
real estate experience including commercial and 
residential development and structuring of real estate 
investment partnerships. A biography for Reid 
Weppler is included in Section IV, Fund Management. 
 
 
Strategies The Fund seeks to capitalize on the need for 
mezzanine financing created by maturing commercial 
mortgages and the current environment that dictates 
more restrictive lending requirements for traditional 
first mortgage lenders.  As Sponsor guides 
investment from late 2009 through 2011, mortgages 
issued in each year from 1999 through 2007 will be 
maturing, and it is anticipated borrowers will be 
unable to obtain first mortgages large enough to pay 
off maturing debt.  As detailed in Section V, Market 
Context, issuers of mortgage loans for commercial 
properties are currently underwriting first mortgage 
loans up to a maximum loan-to-value ratio (“LTV”) of 
60%, whereas traditional first mortgages were issued 
up to 80% LTV on average over the last 10 years.  
The amount of new first mortgage loans is further 
constrained by the underlying values of properties, 
which are currently declining rapidly. 
 
In addition to filling in pure financing gaps, through 
its extensive knowledge of real estate finance, 
Sponsor will work with parties in distressed situations 
 




in order to allow borrowers to refinance creating 
opportunities for Fund investments. 
 
Although the scale of opportunities across the United 
States is large, the Fund will only make investments 
in the D.C. region due to Sponsor’s knowledge of the 
local market and contacts in the local real estate 
industry. 
 
By investing with a local manager who understands 
both the real estate finance investment vehicles as 
well as the underlying real estate assets themselves, 
the Fund seeks to maximize its opportunity for 
successful investments. 
 
The Fund will secure its loans through borrower’s 
pledge of ownership interest in underlying properties.  
With the guarantor capacity of FRM, the Fund is 
equipped to step-in-the-shoes of borrowers should it 
be necessary to take control of a property and 
successfully operate it under terms of the applicable 
existing senior debt instruments.   
 
The Fund intends to seek additional financing, not to 
exceed 50% of Gross Proceeds (as defined in Section 
III, Fund Structure and Fees) in order to defer 
investor capital and enhance investor returns.  The 
Fund will establish an Interest Reserve from 
investment proceeds in order to pay interest 
expenses associated with Fund borrowings. 
 
By charging no upfront fees on committed capital 
(only a management fee on invested capital), the 
Sponsor believes it is offering a very competitive fee 
structure. 
 
An investment in the Fund’s limited partnership 
interests (the “Interests”) is speculative and involves 
a high degree of risk. There can be no assurance that 
the Fund will achieve its objectives. Investors must be 
prepared to lose all or substantially all of their 
investment in the Interests.  
 
The Offering Interests are being privately offered hereby to Eligible 
Investors (as defined below). 
 
Eligible Investors Each prospective investor is required to meet the 
qualifications specified in the Fund’s Subscription 
Agreement.  Investors must either meet the 
 




requirements of an “accredited Investor” as defined 
by the Securities Act of 1933 or be deemed by the 
Sponsor to meet non-accredited investor 
requirements under Regulation D by demonstrating 
that they are highly financially sophisticated and 
capable of evaluating the complex risks of an 
investment in the Fund. 
 
Minimum Capital  
Commitment The minimum Capital Commitment is $5,000,000.  
Sponsor may waive the minimum capital requirement 
in its sole discretion. 
 
Closing Date The Closing Date (“Closing”) is anticipated to occur on 
or about June 1, 2009. 
 
Draw Period Sponsor may call for capital contributions on an as 
needed basis commencing upon Closing and ending 
upon December 31, 2011. 
 
 
Distribution Period The Fund will make distributions to the investors on a 
quarterly basis.  It is anticipated that full repayment 
of capital will occur within 6 years of the final capital 
contribution made during the Draw Period. 
 
Management Fee The Fund will pay GRW a Management Fee in the 
amount of 0.75% per annum on the outstanding 
balance of Fund investments, which shall be paid 
from borrower’s mezzanine debt service payments. 
 
Monthly Management  
Fee A monthly management fee is paid to GRW by the 
Fund in arrears as of the end of each month. The 
Monthly Management Fee is equal to the total 
Management Fee divided by the number of months in 
the Distribution Period. 
 
Organization & Offering 
Allowance The Organization & Offering Allowance, calculated as 
0.30% of Gross Proceeds, is paid to the Sponsor at 
Closing to cover expenses incurred for organizing and 
marketing the Offering.   
 
Bridge Loan The Fund intends to seek additional financing (the 
“Bridge Loan”), not to exceed 50% of Gross Proceeds 
(as defined in Section III, Fund Structure and Fees) in 
order to defer investor capital and enhance investor 
returns.  The Fund will establish an Interest Reserve 
 




from investment proceeds in order to pay interest 
expenses associated with Fund borrowings. 
 
 
Specified Investments All investments will be specified in a supplement to 
the PPM prior to the Fund closing on such financing.  
Investors will have an opportunity to object to any 
loan deemed not suitable for investment.  See 
additional detail in Section II, Investment Strategy 
Sponsor Approach. 
 







Washington, D.C. Region 
As previously indicated, the Fund will limit its investments to commercial 
properties in the Metropolitan Washington region.  Investment is being focused 
in this region, because a) it has consistently performed as one of the top office 
markets in the country with high rents and low vacancy; b) the Washington 
region economy benefits greatly from the presence of the federal government 
and tends to outperform other economies in terms of job growth during 
economic downturns; and c) the Sponsor and Committee Members have 
expertise in this area.  See Section V, Washington Metro Region, for more detail 
on the local area office market and economy.  The Sponsor believes that part of 
the problem with the real estate debt and equity investments that fueled the real 
estate boom of the last 10 years was that they were structured by investment 
people with little on-the-ground local real estate experience. 
 
80% Loan To Value Maximum 
Fund sponsored mezzanine loans will not exceed a combined Loan To Value ratio 
of 80% including any senior debt.  With the assumption that issuers of new first 
mortgages will lend in the range of 50-60% LTV, that leaves a significant gap of 
20-30% of the value of the asset where the Fund can target its loans. 
 
Existing Assets 
The Fund will target existing stabilized assets that have mortgages which are 
maturing. By steering away from construction loans and transitional properties, 
which haven’t yet stabilized, the Fund seeks to limit its risk for non-performing 
loans. 
 
Loan Sized to 10% of Fund Maximum 
In order to reduce the impact of the failure of any single loan on the overall 
performance of the Fund, no loan shall be made that is in excess of 10% of Net 
Proceeds (See Section III, Fund Structure for calculation of Net Proceeds). 
 
In-Place Income 
For operating office buildings, all loans will be underwritten based on then 
current operating income as evidenced by current rent roll supported by 
executed leases. Many loans in recent years were based on valuations which 
assumed aggressive future income growth as represented in the borrower’s pro 
forma.  To the extent the Sponsor identifies opportunities in which in-place 
income and executed leases are not applicable (example: hotels or vacant 
buildings), the Advisory Committee will assist Sponsor in evaluating the 
appropriate value assumptions. 
 
Loan Security 
Borrowers of Fund debt will pledge their ownership interest in their properties as 
collateral for the loans.  This structure provides better security for the Fund than 
a title lien on the property that is subordinate to that of the senior mortgagee. In 
the event of default, the Fund may opt to cause a foreclosure sale for the 
borrower’s interest in the property and ultimately seek to take control of the 
 




property subject to the senior debt in place (i.e. step-in-the-shoes of the 
borrower). 
 
Investment Criteria Deviations 
To the extent the Fund desires to make a loan to an asset that deviates from the 
Investment Criteria, such deviation will be noted in a Supplement to the PPM, 
and investors will have five business days to object to the investment.  See 
Specified Investments for more detail on investment objections. 
 
 
Opportunities – Maturing Debt 
 
As previously described, the Sponsor sees a tremendous opportunity for high-
yielding mezzanine debt to fill in the gap between new senior mortgages and 
local sponsor equity.  While one of the challenges lies in pricing mezzanine debt 
that when added to the senior debt still results in a serviceable debt load, the 
combination of a low interest rate environment with increasing capitalization 
rates provides room for higher mezzanine debt rates that can still produce 
positive leverage for the borrower. 
 
Loan Maturities 
While 10 year mortgages have dominated the commercial mortgage market in 
1999, 5 and 7 year term loans became increasingly popular over the past 5 
years.  With a variety of 5, 7 & 10 year existing loans out in the market and a 
Draw Period of 2.5 years, prospective investment opportunities may involve 
existing loans that were originated every year from 1999 through 2007 
(maturing in 2009 – 2011). 
 
Pure LTV Gap 
For older loans that were issued in 1999 (as an example), there will be some 
properties that have held or slightly increased their value as of 2009, but the 
borrower is unable to repay the existing mortgage through refinancing due to 
more conservative underwriting (lower LTVs).  Such scenarios will provide 
opportunities for Fund loans to borrowers who need to refinance and don’t want 
or can’t afford to put any more equity into the deal. 
 
Commercial Mortgage Back Securities (“CMBS”) 
As discussed in more detail in Section V, Market Context, one challenge to the 
placement of new mezzanine debt is the willingness of existing lenders to extend 
maturing loans when possible.  This becomes somewhat less of an option for 
maturing loans that were rolled into larger CMBS offerings. 
 
1. Special Servicing. Borrowers of CMBS loans that are unable to repay the 
balance of the loan upon maturity will be transferred 
to special servicing.  Depending on the CMBS fund 
documents, even if the loan was previously 
performing, the special servicer may only be able to 
extend the loan for two 1-year periods.  The Fund will 
seek opportunities by working with special servicers 
 




and borrowers to locate loans that have reached their 
maximum extension term in the CMBS portfolio. 
 
 Additionally, depending upon the value of the 
underlying asset, there is the possibility of “tranche-
warfare”, in which the lowest rated pieces of the 
CMBS are “out of the money” so they will push for 
extension of the maturity, whereas higher rated 
pieces that are in the money will push for foreclosure.  
Often the special servicer is directed by the lowest 
rated piece that is in the money; however, 
determination of who is in the money is dependent 
upon today’s valuations, which can be highly 
contested.  The Sponsor will again work with special 
servicers that are caught in tranche-warfare scenarios 
and seek to find a pay-off that is acceptable to the 
servicer by arranging new financing which will contain 
Fund mezzanine debt. 
 
2. Hyper-amortization Some CMBS loans, particularly older vintages, were 
structured with hyper-amortization provisions.  In 
these cases, the original 10-year term is listed as the 
“original maturity”, and the borrower has the option 
after 10 years to convert into another 10-20 year 
term.  The catch in this situation is that the interest 
rate will increase, and the lender will sweep all 
remaining cash flow on a monthly basis to pay down 
the principal balance of the mortgage.  This is an 
option for borrowers that at least allows them to hold 
onto their properties; however, due to the extremely 
high cost of the debt, it also provides an incentive for 
borrowers to refinance to the extent that is financially 
feasible for them.  These scenarios could potentially 




Distressed Loans  
In addition to the specific CMBS opportunities described above, the Sponsor will 
endeavor to work with any and all parties involved in distressed loan situations 
to the extent that the same provides an opportunity for the Fund to make an 
investment in a new capitalization of the asset.  As an example, Sponsor might 
advise prospective borrower on purchase of the distressed existing loan from 
existing senior lender, assist borrower in foreclosing out any existing subordinate 
debt, and then further assist in arranging a new first mortgage with which the 
Fund would pair a new mezzanine loan. 
 
 







The overall approach of the Sponsor is to utilize the talent and experience of 
GRW to locate investment opportunities that carry a level of risk that is 
commensurate with the return profile of the investors.  By employing an 
Advisory Committee, a majority of whom have no economic interest in the Fund 
whatsoever, investors can be assured that there are no conflicts of interest while 
also gaining the benefit of the collective experience of the Committee Members. 
 
Washington Region Investments 
All Fund investments will be made within the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan 
region, which includes the District of Columbia, northern Virginia (Arlington, 
Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties and the City of Alexandria) and 
suburban Maryland (Montgomery, Prince George’s and Frederick Counties).  The 
Washington region has consistently performed as one of the top office markets in 
the country as gauged by high rental rates and low vacancy (see Section V, 
Washington Metro Region for more detail on the local area office market and 
economy).  The Sponsor believes that it is best suited focusing investments in 
the territory that its principals are most familiar with and in which they have 
gained the bulk of their experience. By knowing so many of the players and 
having good relationships with many local commercial real estate owners, the 
Sponsor believes that it will see many opportunities and understand the 
fundamentals of those properties better than national competitors.  The Sponsor 
believes that with economic terms being equal, local borrowers will favor the 
Fund’s local hands-on experience and relationship as opposed to funds 




In order to give investors ultimate approval rights over the Fund’s investments, 
all loans that are intended to be made by the Fund will be disclosed in advance in 
a Supplement to the PPM.  Investors will have five business days to object to the 
investment.  If an objection is received, all investors will be notified of such 
objection. Investors will then have five additional business days to notify the 
Sponsor whether they also object to such investment.  Investors comprising a 
Super Majority Interest in the Fund (defined as 75% or greater of total Limited 
Partnership Interests) must object to an investment to cause the Fund not to 
make such investment.   
 
Leverage – Limited to 50% of Gross Proceeds 
In order to increase investor returns, the Fund may obtain financing in order to 
defer investor Capital Contributions. Such additional financing shall not exceed 
50% of the total amount of committed capital (Gross Proceeds).  By limiting the 
amount of debt the Fund may take on, the Sponsor seeks a more conservative 
approach to increasing yields by taking on a manageable level of financing risk.  
 
 





Comprehensive Due Diligence, Underwriting & Stress-Tests 
The Sponsor will perform thorough underwriting of the property, its in-place 
income, and all anticipated sources of capital for the borrower.  Sponsor will 
conduct due diligence investigations to include a physical assessment of the 
asset; environmental assessment reports; detailed analysis of leases and 
lessees; review of capital expenditure budgets; rollover assumptions and 
analyses; and a complete review of borrowers credit history and real estate 
experience.  Sponsor will also perform stress-tests to analyze likely outcomes 
from possible events including interest-rate sensitivities, lessee bankruptcies and 
default. 
 
FRM Guarantee for Step-in-the-Shoes Event or Fund Borrowings 
Although the Sponsor’s approach and strategy of the Fund are designed to 
minimize the chances of default, it is imperative that the Fund be in a position to 
take action and foreclose upon the borrower’s collateral in the event of default.  
The Fund will most likely be required to enter into an intercreditor agreement 
with the senior mortgagee behind which the Fund issues its mezzanine debt.  
Having the financial capacity to perform in the event of borrower default may be 
necessary in order for senior mortgagees to allow the borrower to place the 
Fund’s mezzanine debt on the property. 
 
For Fund mezzanine loans issued to borrowers, it is anticipated that the borrower 
will pledge for security its ownership interest in the property.  This is a unique 
and important distinction from the pledge of the property itself.  Since the first 
mortgage lender has lien priority, a subordinate lien position on the property 
itself is not effective collateral in the event of decreased property value.  Since 
the ownership interest is pledged as collateral, in the event of a borrower default, 
the Fund will have the option to “step-in-the-shoes” of the borrower i.e. take 
control of the ownership and have the ability to work the situation out with the 
senior lender and underlying asset.  In such a situation, FRM will provide any 
necessary guarantees for the benefit of senior mortgage holders or other in order 
to allow the Fund to effectively work-out the situation.  
 
FRM will also provide any guarantees necessary for the Fund to borrow the 
Bridge Loan in order to defer investor Capital Contributions.  The Sponsor will 
endeavor to pledge the Limited Partners Subscription Agreements as collateral 
for the Bridge Loan; however, Sponsor’s ability to do so will greatly depend on 
the credit quality of the Limited Partners.  FRM’s parent company currently has 
over $2 billion in cash with a market capitalization in excess of $5 billion. 
 
 






By structuring the Fund documents accordingly, the Fund reserves the right, 
subject to approval from the Committee, to extend maturing loans to the extent 
necessary should the loans be performing.  As detailed in Section VII, there are 
many risks that could lead to a borrower of Fund debt not being able to repay 
the balloon loan balance upon maturity.  Having the flexibility to extend 
(contrary to many CMBS loans) gives the Fund more options to deal with default 
scenarios in order to improve chances of salvaging Fund investments. 
 
Debt Layer Restrictions 
By restricting Fund investments to mezzanine financing that is only subordinate 
to the first mortgage and further restricting borrowers from placing any 
additional debt behind (subordinate to) the Fund’s loan, the Sponsor will avoid 
investments with borrowers who seek to place excessive amounts of debt on 
their properties (which increase risks including risk of default on mortgage debt). 
 
 
III. Fund Structure and Fees 
 
12 
Gross Proceeds (Committed Capital) 150,000,000$  
Organization & Offering Allowance 450,000$         0.30%
Interest Expense 12,000,000$    8.00%





The Fund is a recently formed Delaware Limited Partnership that is exempt from 
registration under Regulation D (private placement exemption) of the Securities 
Act of 1933. 
 
Limited Partners 
Participating investors will purchase limited partnership interests in the Fund, 
and as limited partners, will directly own debt which is issued to selected 




Investors will be admitted to the Fund through execution of individual 
Subscription Agreements which will set forth the details and obligations of each 
investor’s capital commitment to the Fund.  Sponsor may pledge Subscription 
Agreements as collateral for borrowings from the Bridge Loan. 
 
Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement (“LPA”) 
Each investor will also execute a signature page to the master LPA which will 
govern the affairs and eventual unwinding of the Fund. 
 
 









The term Gross Proceeds defines the total amount of capital contributed by the 
Limited Partners to the Fund. 
 
Organization & Offering Allowance 
The Organization & Offering Allowance, calculated as 0.30% of Gross Proceeds, 
is paid to the Sponsor at Closing to cover expenses incurred for organizing and 
marketing the Offering.   
 
Interest Expense 
An Interest Reserve will be established in an amount equal to 8.00% of Gross 
Proceeds and will be utilized to pay for interest costs arising from borrowings 










The Fund will pay GRW a management fee in the amount of 0.75% per annum 
on the outstanding balance of Fund investments, which shall be paid from 
borrower’s mezzanine debt service payments on a monthly basis.   
 
Below is a schedule of anticipated management fees based on Target Investment 





Calendar Year Mgmt Fee
2009 77,330$         
2010 617,535$        
2011 1,017,349$     
2012 1,020,203$     
2013 1,013,598$     
2014 906,208$        
2015 351,017$        








The current Committee Members are David Sislen, Stacey Berger and Reid 
Weppler. 
 
David Sislen is the founder and President of Bristol Capital Corporation, which 
owns and/or manages a portfolio of industrial and other real estate assets, as 
well as provides advisory services for distressed debt on commercial real estate 
assets. Prior to founding Bristol Capital Corporation, Mr. Sislen was a Senior Vice 
President of CRI, Inc., where his responsibilities included development, 
acquisition and syndication of commercial real estate. He is a Trustee Emeritus of 
The Edmund Burke School in Washington, D.C., a member of The President’s 
Council at Tulane University and an instructor at Johns Hopkins University’s 
Carey School of Business, where he teaches real estate finance. Mr. Sislen has a 
BA in Economics from Tulane University and a MBA from the University of 
Chicago Graduate School of Business.  
 
Stacey Berger is Executive Vice President of Midland Loan Services, Inc., 
responsible for business development, marketing and strategy.  Midland, a PNC 
Real Estate company, is the leading provider of loan servicing, asset 
management and technology solutions for the commercial mortgage finance 
industry.  The company is one of the nation's largest commercial loan servicers 
with over $266 billion in outstanding balances. Midland is also a leading third 
party special servicer, and has recovered over $15 billion on behalf of its clients 
since 1991. Midland maintains the industry's highest ratings as a servicer and 
special servicer from Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor's.  Prior to joining 
Midland in 1991, Mr. Berger was the senior executive responsible for the real 
estate asset management and investment advisory services for a subsidiary of 
Landmark Land Company, Inc.  Mr. Berger received a BA degree in Economics 
and an MBA degree from Tulane University.  Mr. Berger is the past President of 
the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association, (CMSA), and past Vice 
Chairman of the commercial / multifamily board of governors (COMBOG) of the 
Mortgage Bankers Association. 
 
Reid Weppler’s biography is detailed below. 
 
GRW Funds, Inc. (Managing Member of Sponsor) 
 
Reid Weppler is the sole owner of GRW Funds, Inc. (“GRW”), which is the 
Managing Member of the Sponsor.  Mr. Weppler is the principal contact for the 
investors.  GRW, which has one other full time employee (Gordon Fraley), will be 
responsible for raising investment capital and locating suitable investments for 









President, GRW Funds, Inc. 
Prior to founding GRW Funds, Inc. in 2009, Reid Weppler worked as a 
Development Manager for Vornado/Charles E. Smith, the D.C. region 
platform for Vornado Realty Trust, one of the largest equity REITs in the 
United States by market capitalization.  Vornado/Charles E. Smith is the 
largest owner of commercial real estate in the Washington region.  As 
Development Manager, Mr. Weppler led the development of a 365,000 SF 
trophy office building at the corner of 17th and H Streets, NW, that will be 
home to PNC Bank’s new regional headquarters.  During his tenure at 
Vornado, he also worked to simplify a complicated three-tier partnership 
structure for the development of Waterfront Station in southwest 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Prior to joining Vornado, Mr. Weppler was an Assistant Vice President at 
Wilder Richman Securities Corporation (“WRSC”), an affiliate of Greenwich 
based The Richman Group, where he structured limited partnership 
investment funds and marketed offerings to the world’s largest banks and 
other financial institutions helping to raise in excess of $1 billion during 
his tenure. While working for WRSC, Mr. Weppler was a Registered 
Representative holding Series 22 and 63 securities licenses. 
 
Mr. Weppler holds a B.S. in Business Administration with a concentration 
in finance from the Kogod College of Business at American University and 
is a candidate for a MS in Real Estate in May 2009 from the Carey 
Business School at Johns Hopkins University. 
 
Gordon Fraley 
Executive Vice-President, GRW Funds, Inc. 
Prior to joining GRW in 2009, Mr. Fraley was a Senior Development 
Manager for Vornado/Charles E. Smith.  He holds a BS in Environmental 
and Urban Planning from the University of Virginia. 
 
 






Buoyed by the presence of the federal government, the Washington region has 
one of the most stable local economies in the country.  According to a report1 by 
Grubb and Ellis, “the Washington region outperforms the nation in nearly every 




















The Washington metro area was the only large metro area that exhibited year 





















                                                 
1 Grubb & Ellis Company. (2009). District of Columbia_Office. 2009 Real Estate Forecast. 
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Source: Grubb & Ellis - 2009 Real Estate Forecast
 
Local Office Market 
 
With a strong local economy, the Washington 
metro area has one of the most attractive 
commercial real estate markets in the country 
as exhibited by consistently low vacancy rates 
and high rental rates.  Although the 
Washington region is certainly not immune to 
the economic recession and looming troubles 
in the commercial real estate market, most 
believe that commercial real estate in this 
region will continue to be successful over the 
long term.  As exhibited in the chart below, 
while office vacancy rates in the area increased 
in 2008, which trend is likely to continue, the 
overall vacancy rate is well below the national 
average and is the fifth lowest (of large metro 
areas) in the country. Rental rates in the 
Washington D.C. are second in the country 
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Commercial Mortgage Market 
 
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2008 there were $3.4 trillion of outstanding 
commercial mortgages up from $1 trillion in 1995. The following chart prepared 
by Prudential Real Estate Investors (“PREI”) depicts the increase in outstanding 
commercial mortgage holdings over a 30 year period.  The chart also illustrates 
PREI’s estimates of the “deleveraging effect” over the next four years as a result 




















The next chart prepared by GRW indicates the proportionate composition of the 













Massive Deleveraging – the “Credit Crunch” 
 
Commercial Mortgage Back Securities (“CMBS”) 
As faith in collateral and ratings of securitized mortgage bonds has been 

















Life Insurance Companies 
As of early 2009, life insurance companies have suspended new commercial 
mortgage originations 1 . Some insurance companies are not even willing to 
refinance existing loans that are maturing. 
 
Commercial Banks 
Traditional commercial bank lenders are also substantially reducing lending as 
they struggle with bad loans issued over the past 5 years and the overall impact 
of the capital markets on portfolio values and equity values. As banks transition 
to much more conservative underwriting, values are deteriorating and cash flow 














                                                 
1 Many insurers halt lending as crisis widens. (2009, March 6).  Commercial Mortgage Alert.  
 















Sources: Federal Reserve; JP Morgan







According to PREI’s research1, $350 billion of commercial mortgages will come 
due annually for the next several years.  Foresight Analytics estimates2 that the 
amount of commercial mortgages coming due in 2009 alone is $160 billion.  
GRW has calculated its own estimates of the volume of maturing mortgages in 



















The next chart, prepared by PREI, illustrates the anticipated debt shortfall from 
the volume of maturing mortgages exceeding the volume of new debt being 
originated.  The area noted as “debt capital shortfall” highlights the area of 
opportunity that the Fund seeks to exploit. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Fiorilla, P. and Hess, R. (2008, December). Deleveraging the commercial real estate market. 
Prudential Real Estate Investors Research. 
2 Foresight Analytics.  (2009, January 30). Advance 4Q 2008 Delinquency Rate Estimates. 
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Source: Real Capital Analytics 
Source: JPMorgan CMBS Monitor 
 
Property Values and Loan Underwriting 
 
Two of the major issues facing the commercial mortgages industry are falling 
values and tighter loan underwriting. 
 
Values  
With cap rates on a steady decline from 
2000 – 2007, buyers in 2007 purchased at 
all time highs.  Cap rates have been 
climbing in a hurry given the lack of buyers 
in the market, lack of available financing, 
and overall impact of the recession on 
commercial real estate demand. To the 
extent anything is trading, buyers are 
requiring adequate compensation for risk, 
and cap rates must exceed the cost of 
financing. The impact is that properties will 
not be worth as much as they were when 
existing loans were originated (especially 
loans issued in the past 5 years), and 
borrowers will only be able to refinance 
based on today’s lower values.  
 
Loan-to-Value (“LTV”) 
Due to the losses that have been 
experienced and are projected to be 
incurred by lenders and investors (a 
projected tripling in default rate equating to 
7% of total unpaid balances – according to Reis Inc.1) as a result of deteriorating 
values and aggressive underwriting in past years, traditional banks are willing to 
loan no more than 60% loan-to-value for new senior mortgages.  Over the past 
10 years, commercial mortgages were issued at LTV’s of 80% on average.  When 
taking into account aggressive income assumptions, particularly in the CMBS 
market within the last 5 years, the loans may have really been originated at 
levels in excess of 100% LTV.   
 
                                                 
1 Huge commercial real estate loan losses are on the horizon. (2009, March 25). Property Wire. 
 




Maturity Defaults  
What this means is that the amounts of new first mortgage loans, in most cases, 
will not be sufficient to repay the balance of maturing mortgages.  This creates a 
scenario whereby borrowers will have to contribute excessive amounts of capital 
just to hold onto their properties.  This creates an opportunity for new 
mezzanine financing that can help borrowers to refinance.  Actual individual 
scenarios will be much more complicated depending on the different types of 
lenders, number of layers of existing debt, and level of leverage being employed. 
 
 
Loan Extensions – “Money Good”? 
 
To the extent possible, many lenders will look to extend loans that are “money 
good” to push off difficult write-down (capital hits on their own books) or 
foreclosure scenarios with hopes that conditions will improve down the road. 
Loans where borrowers have kept current with their payments and have 
sufficient income to service the existing debt are considered “money good”. 
Willingness of lenders to extend loans will depend on the type of lender/issuer. 
 
Commercial Banks and Life Insurance Companies  
Commercial banks and life insurance companies that own the existing mortgages 
for their own account will be the most willing to extend loans that are “money 




CMBS issuers will be constrained in their ability to extend loans based on 
whatever is permitted in the CMBS fund documents.  Loan extensions would be 
handled by the special servicer. Very often the CMBS loans were written such 
that the special servicer has the ability to extend the loan for one year or 
possibly two one-year extensions.  As discussed in Section II, the Fund will seek 
opportunities by working with special servicers and borrowers to locate loans 










As previously detailed, the Fund will focus debt investments within the 
Washington, D.C. region.  As such, it is important to understand the scale of 
commercial real estate in the Washington metro area as compared to the rest of 
the Nation. The chart below depicts the level of “stressed”1 commercial real 
estate assets in the major real estate markets in the country.  As listed in a 
March 2009 report from local research company Delta Associates, the “stressed” 























As of March 2009, there is approximately $3 billion of stressed commercial real 
estate in the Washington region.  The targeted investable capital of the Fund at 
$137.6 million (see “Use of Funds” in Section III, Fund Structure and Fees) is 
less than 5% of the total stressed commercial real estate debt currently in the 
local market.  With the percentage of loan maturities projected to increase 
dramatically over the next several years, the Sponsor anticipates ample 
opportunities for Fund mezzanine loans within the local market. 
                                                 
1 “These properties have characteristics of concern in the short term – maturing loans, 
bankrupt tenants, underperformance, financially troubled owner, or significant other 
obstacles”. Delta Associates (2009, March). Distressed Commercial Real Estate Journal. 
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Stabilized NOI 13.3$   Stabilized NOI 14.7$    
Cap Rate 10% Cap Rate 10%





























Note: This section does not represent prospective investments and in no 
way should be construed or interpreted as market or fund performance 
projections.  The purpose of this section is solely to illustrate examples 
of how investment opportunities may possibly arise. 
 
In order to give prospective investors a better idea of how potential investment 
opportunities will arise and possible play out, the team at GRW Funds, Inc. has 




As discussed in Section II, with a variety of 5, 7 & 10 year existing loans out in 
the market and a Draw Period of 2.5 years, prospective Fund opportunities may 
involve existing loans that were originated every year from 1999 through 2007 




All scenarios assume a hypothetical existing senior mortgage of $100,000,000 
for ease of comparison. 
 
Pure LTV Gap 
As discussed in Section II, there may be some older vintage loans where the 
properties have held or slightly increased their value, but the borrower is unable 
to repay the existing mortgage through refinancing due to more conservative 















In this example, the property’s income has increased by approximately 1% 
annually for the past 10 years.  At the same 10% cap rate the property was 
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valued at in 1999, the property has increased in value by $14 million in 2009.  
However, due to lower LTV underwriting, the borrower is only able to raise $88 
million from a new first mortgage lender to pay off the maturing $100 million 
loan.  In this case, the existing lender may or may not be willing to extend the 
loan.  By refinancing with a 7.75% fixed rate 10-year (25 year amortization) new 
first mortgage loan up to 60% LTV, the borrower could borrow $15 million from 




Maturing Loan Balance (100.00)$      
New Senior Loan 88.37           
New Mezz Loan 14.73           
GP Cash from Refinancing 3.10$            
Revalued Capital Stack
Revalued Asset 147.28$        
New Senior Loan 88.37           60%
New Mezz Loan 14.73           10%
Refinanced Equity in 44.18$          30%
Cash Flow
2009 NOI 14.73$          
Less Debt Service
1st Mortgage (7.75%) (8.10)            
GRW Mezz Debt (14%) (2.21)            
Free and Clear Cash 4.42$            
GP Cash on Cash Return 10.00%
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Stabilized NOI 9.3$     Stabilized NOI 10.3$    
Cap Rate 7% Cap Rate 10%
















$20M - 15% LTV
GP - $13M - 10% LTV
90% GP
$21M - 20% LTV
GRW Mezzanine Debt




7.75% - 10 yr
 
More Complicated Situation - Distressed CMBS Loan 
With the more recent vintages of commercial loans, we are more likely to run 
into distressed situations.  The following is an example of a property with an 
existing 5-year mortgage originated in 2004 with existing mezzanine debt that is 










In this example, the property income has increased by approximately 2% 
annually for the past 5 years; however, assuming an increase in the cap rate 
from 7% to 10% since 2004 (43% increase), the property has decreased in 
value by $30 million in 2009.  The lower LTV underwriting further exacerbates 
the level of distress as the property is barely worth the amount of the existing 
senior mortgage loan.  The existing mezzanine debt has lost all value and will 
most likely just walk away. The following are possibilities of how this situation 
might further play out: 
 
1) The borrower is so “under water” that he gives up the keys, walks away, 
and the existing senior mortgagee takes title to the asset.  There is still 
opportunity for the Fund in this case on the sale of the foreclosed asset.  
Any new buyer will be looking for as much financing as possible and the 
Fund mezzanine financing will be an attractive source.  As opposed to the 
capital stack listed above, the new buyer would likely utilize a lower 
amount of mezzanine financing in order to arrange a positive leverage 
situation. 
 




Maturing Loan Balance (100.00)$      
New Senior Loan 61.83           
New Mezz Loan 20.00           
GP New Equity Investment 21.22           
XYZ Mezzanine Walk-away Funds 3.05$            
Revalued Capital Stack
Revalued Asset 103.05$        
New Senior Loan 61.83           60%
New Mezz Loan 20.00           19%
Refinanced Equity in 21.22$          21%
Cash Flow
2009 NOI 10.30$          
Less Debt Service
1st Mortgage (7.75%) (5.67)            
GRW Mezz Debt (14%) (3.00)            
Free and Clear Cash 1.64$            
GP Cash on Cash Return 7.71%
WACC (w/ Constants) 10.59%
 
2) As depicted above, in order to avoid negative tax consequences (as well 
as other potential motivations such as maintaining other leasing and 
management fee income), we assume the existing borrower wants to hold 
onto the property.  The borrower accepts that its existing $13 million of 
equity has been wiped away.  The borrower raises as much new debt as 
possible including a $20 million fund investment at 14% and also 
contributes an additional $21 million of new equity in order to repay the 
existing $100 million senior mortgage.  In this case, the existing 
mezzanine debt walks away with $3 million on its $20 million investment.  
The borrower has created a negative leverage situation; however he is 
willing to accept a 7.7% return on his new cash investment in order to 
avoid contributing the additional $20 million that is covered by the Fund’s 





























Purchase of Distressed Loan (80.00)$      
New Senior Loan 61.83           
New Mezz Loan 20.00           
GP Cash-Out 1.83             
Revalued Capital Stack
Revalued Asset 103.05$        
New Senior Loan 61.83           60%
New Mezz Loan 20.00           19%
Refinanced Equity in 21.22$          21%
Cash Flow
2009 NOI 10.30$          
Less Debt Service
1st Mortgage (7.75%) (5.67)            
GRW Mezz Debt (14%) (3.00)            
Free and Clear Cash 1.64$            
GP Cash on Cash Return 7.71%
WACC (w/ Constants) 10.59%
 
3) A variant on #2 above further demonstrates how the Sponsor anticipates 
adding value to a situation by working with the various parties to create 
an opportunity for a Fund investment.  In this case, the Sponsor works 
with the borrower and advises him to purchase the distressed loan from 
the existing senior mortgagee at a 20% discount.  The senior mortgagee 
does not want to foreclosure on the property as previously discussed, 
because it is not in the business of owning property; does not want to 
spend the additional time and money on a costly foreclosure process; and 
does not want to take the additional risk that the value of the property 
further deteriorates during such a process.  Because the lender would 
almost certainly never recoup 100% of its distressed loan balance in this 
case, the lender is likely to accept a discounted offer for the loan. Rather 
than even having to spend the time marketing the distressed loan for sale, 
the Sponsor will work with the lender/special servicer on sale of the 
distressed loan to the borrower.  After the borrower becomes the holder 
of the first mortgage note, the Sponsor advises borrower though 
immediate foreclosure of the property whereby the existing XYZ 
mezzanine financing is wiped out. Assuming the existing lender accepts 
$80 million for the distressed $100 million loan, upon refinancing with 
new Fund mezzanine debt, the borrower is actually able to pocket nearly 
$2 million in cash.  The borrower in this example has avoided putting in 
$20 million in new equity through the Sponsor’s guidance to buy its own 




























Investors must understand that investments in the Fund are highly 
speculative investments.  There is no guarantee that the targeted 
returns will be achieved or even that the original investment will be 
returned. 
 
Default - There is certain risk that borrowers of the Fund’s mezzanine debt will 
default on the obligation to make debt service payments to the Fund.   
 
Step-in-the-Shoes - As noted in Section II, borrowers of Fund debt will 
pledge their ownership interest in their properties as collateral for the loans.  In 
the event of default, the Fund may opt to cause a forecloseure sale for the 
borrower’s interest in the property and ultimately seek to take control of the 
property subject to the senior debt in place (i.e. step-in-the-shoes of the 
borrower).   
 
Walk Away - The Sponsor will decide in its sole discretion, provided it has 
the required majority support from the Committee, whether or not to attempt to 
take control of a property.  In certain circumstances, if it does not make sound 
economic sense to take control as it would pose additional financial or other risk, 
the Sponsor may elect to cause the Fund to abandon its investment and walk 
away. 
 
The following are several, but by no means all, of the risks that could lead to the 
default on Fund investments.  
 
Vacancy  
Increased vacancy, which could be caused by a number of factors including 
recessionary impact on a) existing tenants who go out of business and vacate 
leased space or b) general demand for new tenants as existing leases expire.  
Increased vacancy could lead to the borrower having difficulty making debt 
service payments.  
 
Values 
If values continue to fall during the period in which the Fund’s investments are 
outstanding, some borrowers may have difficulty finding adequate proceeds to 
refinance and repay the principal balance of the Fund’s investment.  Note: Fund 
investments are likely to be structured with amortization periods that 
exceed the term of the investments.  This creates a balloon balance 




Similar to effect of falling values, any unforeseen problems with future credit 
markets that impact the ability of borrowers to refinance or raise additional 










With a goal of maximizing the risk-adjusted return, the Sponsor has endeavored 
to structure the Fund and its governing procedures in order minimize risk and 
maximize the options for dealing with problems.  Although risk cannot be 
eliminated and prospective investors should recognize that the Fund seeks to 
take on risk in order to generate a return, the Sponsor aims to manage and 
reduce risk in the following ways: 
 
Local Real Estate Knowledge  
By focusing its investments in the Washington region, the Fund will benefit from 
the local real estate expertise of the Sponsor and Advisory Committee.  By 
understanding the local market, the Fund will see many opportunities through 
Sponsor’s contacts and understand which properties best fit the Fund’s 
investment objectives and meet or exceed the Investment Criteria (as detailed in 
Section II).  
 
Sound Underwriting  
As detailed in Section II, the Sponsor will perform thorough underwriting of the 
property, its in-place income, and all anticipated sources of capital for the 
borrower.  Sponsor will conduct due diligence investigations to include a physical 
assessment of the asset; environmental assessment reports; detailed analysis of 
leases and lessees; review of capital expenditure budgets; rollover assumptions 
and analyses; and a complete review of borrowers credit history and real estate 
experience.  Sponsor will also perform stress-tests to analyze likely outcomes 
from possible events including interest-rate sensitivities, lessee bankruptcies and 
default. The smaller size of the Fund means that the Sponsor will only select the 
right opportunities; not just try to “fill up the fund”. 
 
Debt Layer Restrictions 
As discussed in Section II, by restricting Fund investments to mezzanine 
financing that is only subordinate to the first mortgage and further restricting 
borrowers from placing any additional debt behind (subordinate to) the Fund’s 
investment, the Sponsor will avoid investments with borrowers who seek to 
place excessive amounts of debt on their properties (which increase risks 
including risk of default on mortgage debt). 
 
Extension Options 
With the extension option flexibility that the Fund has (as discussed in Section 
II) the Fund will be able to extend performing loans in the event the 
aforementioned risks make it difficult for the borrower to repay the maturing 
balance of the Fund’s investment.  
 
 





Even though the Fund itself will have assets limited to the collateral of Specified 
Investments and cash on hand, as discussed in Section II the Sponsor has 
arranged for an affiliate of Fox Realty Trust to provide necessary guarantees in 
the event that the Fund must step-in-the-shoes of a borrower.  Having additional 
capital backing provides additional flexibility for the Fund to work through 
troubled situations.  
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Quarter Investor Total Loan GRW Fee Distributable Investor Investor
Ending Capital Payments Capital Proceeds Cash Flow
9/30/2009 (201,238)$           170,680              (17,191)$             153,489              153,489              (47,748)$             
12/31/2009 (691,581)$           1,319,516           (60,139)$             1,259,377           1,259,377           567,796$             
3/31/2010 (1,081,306)$        1,821,351           (94,445)$             1,726,906           1,726,906           645,599$             
6/30/2010 (15,226,031)$       2,649,237           (137,303)$           2,511,935           2,511,935           (12,714,097)$       
9/30/2010 (15,226,031)$       3,311,547           (171,514)$           3,140,033           3,140,033           (12,085,998)$       
12/31/2010 (28,981,031)$       4,139,433           (214,274)$           3,925,160           3,925,160           (25,055,871)$       
3/31/2011 (15,226,031)$       4,801,743           (248,383)$           4,553,359           4,553,359           (10,672,672)$       
6/30/2011 (1,471,031)$        4,967,320           (256,660)$           4,710,660           4,710,660           3,239,628$          
9/30/2011 (1,471,031)$        4,967,320           (256,326)$           4,710,994           4,710,994           3,239,963$          
12/31/2011 (70,424,688)$       4,967,320           (255,979)$           4,711,341           4,711,341           (65,713,347)$       
3/31/2012 -$                    4,967,320           (255,621)$           4,711,699           4,711,699           4,711,699$          
6/30/2012 -$                    4,967,320           (255,250)$           4,712,070           4,712,070           4,712,070$          
9/30/2012 -$                    4,967,320           (254,865)$           4,712,455           4,712,455           4,712,455$          
12/31/2012 -$                    4,967,320           (254,467)$           4,712,853           4,712,853           4,712,853$          
3/31/2013 -$                    4,967,320           (254,055)$           4,713,265           4,713,265           4,713,265$          
6/30/2013 -$                    4,967,320           (253,628)$           4,713,692           4,713,692           4,713,692$          
9/30/2013 -$                    4,967,320           (253,186)$           4,714,134           4,714,134           4,714,134$          
12/31/2013 -$                    4,967,320           (252,729)$           4,714,591           4,714,591           4,714,591$          
3/31/2014 -$                    4,967,320           (252,255)$           4,715,065           4,715,065           4,715,065$          
6/30/2014 -$                    4,967,320           (251,765)$           4,715,555           4,715,555           4,715,555$          
9/30/2014 -$                    30,955,649          (217,963)$           30,737,686          30,737,686          30,737,686$        
12/31/2014 -$                    16,968,020          (184,226)$           16,783,794          16,783,794          16,783,794$        
3/31/2015 -$                    29,465,453          (142,230)$           29,323,223          29,323,223          29,323,223$        
6/30/2015 -$                    15,477,824          (108,639)$           15,369,186          15,369,186          15,369,186$        
9/30/2015 -$                    27,975,257          (66,792)$             27,908,465          27,908,465          27,908,465$        
12/31/2015 -$                    13,987,628          (33,357)$             13,954,272          13,954,272          13,954,272$        
3/31/2016 -$                    13,325,319          -$                    13,325,319          13,325,319          13,325,319$        
(150,000,000)$  230,943,817$   (5,003,240)$      225,940,577$   
IRR 14.91%
Investment Benefit Schedule
The following are schedules from the Sponsor’s investment projection 
model used to structure the Fund in terms of timing, fees, borrowings, 
anticipated investments (Fund mezzanine loans) and ultimate cash flow 
projections for investors. 
 
Note: The following schedules do not represent actual Specified 
Investments and are only provided for transparency purposes to show 
investors how the flow of funds is anticipated to work.   
 
 






Ending Beg Balance Borrowings Repayment End Balance Payments
9/30/2009 -$                    14,205,000$        -$                    14,205,000$        (201,238)$           
12/31/2009 14,205,000$        27,510,000$        -$                    41,715,000$        (691,581)$           
3/31/2010 41,715,000$        13,755,000$        -$                    55,470,000$        (1,081,306)$        
6/30/2010 55,470,000$        13,755,000$        -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        
9/30/2010 69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        
12/31/2010 69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        
3/31/2011 69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        
6/30/2011 69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        
9/30/2011 69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        
12/31/2011 69,225,000$        -$                    (69,225,000)$       -$                    (980,688)$           
3/31/2012 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
6/30/2012 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
9/30/2012 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
12/31/2012 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
3/31/2013 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
6/30/2013 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
9/30/2013 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
12/31/2013 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
3/31/2014 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
6/30/2014 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
9/30/2014 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
12/31/2014 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
3/31/2015 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
6/30/2015 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
9/30/2015 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
12/31/2015 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
3/31/2016 -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    
69,225,000$      (69,225,000)$    (11,781,000)$    
Bridge Loan - Loan and Interest Schedule
 




Specified Investments - Projected 10 Loan Roll-Up
Loan Ref# Roll-UP
Initial Loan Closing Date 8/1/2009
Last Loan Closing Date 2/1/2011
Last Payment Date 1/1/2016
Total Amount of Loans 137,550,000$      
Average Loan Interest Rate 14.00%
Loan Payment Schedule
Qtr Ending Beg Balance Tot. Principal Tot. Interest Total Payment End Balance
9/30/2009 13,755,000$        (10,264)$             (160,415)$           (170,680)$           13,744,736$        
12/31/2009 27,499,736$        (36,438)$             (1,283,078)$        (1,319,516)$        27,463,297$        
3/31/2010 41,218,297$        (58,377)$             (1,762,974)$        (1,821,351)$        41,159,921$        
6/30/2010 68,669,921$        (86,255)$             (2,562,983)$        (2,649,237)$        68,583,666$        
9/30/2010 82,338,666$        (109,957)$           (3,201,590)$        (3,311,547)$        82,228,709$        
12/31/2010 109,738,709$      (139,661)$           (3,999,772)$        (4,139,433)$        109,599,048$      
3/31/2011 123,354,048$      (165,255)$           (4,636,488)$        (4,801,743)$        123,188,793$      
6/30/2011 136,943,793$      (176,328)$           (4,790,992)$        (4,967,320)$        136,767,465$      
9/30/2011 136,767,465$      (182,572)$           (4,784,748)$        (4,967,320)$        136,584,893$      
12/31/2011 136,584,893$      (189,037)$           (4,778,283)$        (4,967,320)$        136,395,856$      
3/31/2012 136,395,856$      (195,731)$           (4,771,589)$        (4,967,320)$        136,200,125$      
6/30/2012 136,200,125$      (202,662)$           (4,764,658)$        (4,967,320)$        135,997,463$      
9/30/2012 135,997,463$      (209,838)$           (4,757,482)$        (4,967,320)$        135,787,625$      
12/31/2012 135,787,625$      (217,268)$           (4,750,052)$        (4,967,320)$        135,570,357$      
3/31/2013 135,570,357$      (224,962)$           (4,742,358)$        (4,967,320)$        135,345,395$      
6/30/2013 135,345,395$      (232,928)$           (4,734,392)$        (4,967,320)$        135,112,468$      
9/30/2013 135,112,468$      (241,176)$           (4,726,144)$        (4,967,320)$        134,871,292$      
12/31/2013 134,871,292$      (249,716)$           (4,717,604)$        (4,967,320)$        134,621,577$      
3/31/2014 134,621,577$      (258,558)$           (4,708,762)$        (4,967,320)$        134,363,019$      
6/30/2014 134,363,019$      (267,713)$           (4,699,606)$        (4,967,320)$        134,095,305$      
9/30/2014 134,095,305$      (26,887,015)$       (4,068,634)$        (30,955,649)$       107,208,290$      
12/31/2014 107,208,290$      (13,529,131)$       (3,438,889)$        (16,968,020)$       93,679,159$        
3/31/2015 93,679,159$        (26,810,498)$       (2,654,955)$        (29,465,453)$       66,868,660$        
6/30/2015 66,868,660$        (13,449,905)$       (2,027,919)$        (15,477,824)$       53,418,755$        
9/30/2015 53,418,755$        (26,728,467)$       (1,246,790)$        (27,975,257)$       26,690,288$        
12/31/2015 26,690,288$        (13,364,969)$       (622,659)$           (13,987,628)$       13,325,319$        

















Exhibit A. Target Investment Schedules 
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GRW MEZZANINE DEBT I LP
Flow of Funds
Interest Rate 8.50%
Quarter Fund Mezz Cash-Needs Investor Total Loan GRW Fee Distributable Investor Investor
Ending O&O Fee Loans Investment Beg Balance Borrowings Repayment End BalanceInterest Payments Capital Payments Capital Proceeds Cash Flow
9/30/2009 (450,000)$    (13,755,000)$       (14,205,000)$       -$                    14,205,000$        -$                    14,205,000$        (201,238)$           (201,238)$           170,680              (17,191)$             153,489              153,489              (47,748)$             
12/31/2009 -$            (27,510,000)$       (27,510,000)$       14,205,000$        27,510,000$        -$                    41,715,000$        (691,581)$           (691,581)$           1,319,516           (60,139)$             1,259,377           1,259,377           567,796$             
3/31/2010 -$            (13,755,000)$       (13,755,000)$       41,715,000$        13,755,000$        -$                    55,470,000$        (1,081,306)$        (1,081,306)$        1,821,351           (94,445)$             1,726,906           1,726,906           645,599$             
6/30/2010 -$            (27,510,000)$       (27,510,000)$       55,470,000$        13,755,000$        -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        (15,226,031)$       2,649,237           (137,303)$           2,511,935           2,511,935           (12,714,097)$       
9/30/2010 -$            (13,755,000)$       (13,755,000)$       69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        (15,226,031)$       3,311,547           (171,514)$           3,140,033           3,140,033           (12,085,998)$       
12/31/2010 -$            (27,510,000)$       (27,510,000)$       69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        (28,981,031)$       4,139,433           (214,274)$           3,925,160           3,925,160           (25,055,871)$       
3/31/2011 -$            (13,755,000)$       (13,755,000)$       69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        (15,226,031)$       4,801,743           (248,383)$           4,553,359           4,553,359           (10,672,672)$       
6/30/2011 -$            -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        (1,471,031)$        4,967,320           (256,660)$           4,710,660           4,710,660           3,239,628$          
9/30/2011 -$            -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        (1,471,031)$        (1,471,031)$        4,967,320           (256,326)$           4,710,994           4,710,994           3,239,963$          
12/31/2011 -$            -$                    -$                    69,225,000$        -$                    (69,225,000)$       -$                    (980,688)$           (70,424,688)$       4,967,320           (255,979)$           4,711,341           4,711,341           (65,713,347)$       
3/31/2012 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (255,621)$           4,711,699           4,711,699           4,711,699$          
6/30/2012 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (255,250)$           4,712,070           4,712,070           4,712,070$          
9/30/2012 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (254,865)$           4,712,455           4,712,455           4,712,455$          
12/31/2012 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (254,467)$           4,712,853           4,712,853           4,712,853$          
3/31/2013 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (254,055)$           4,713,265           4,713,265           4,713,265$          
6/30/2013 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (253,628)$           4,713,692           4,713,692           4,713,692$          
9/30/2013 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (253,186)$           4,714,134           4,714,134           4,714,134$          
12/31/2013 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (252,729)$           4,714,591           4,714,591           4,714,591$          
3/31/2014 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (252,255)$           4,715,065           4,715,065           4,715,065$          
6/30/2014 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    4,967,320           (251,765)$           4,715,555           4,715,555           4,715,555$          
9/30/2014 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    30,955,649          (217,963)$           30,737,686          30,737,686          30,737,686$        
12/31/2014 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    16,968,020          (184,226)$           16,783,794          16,783,794          16,783,794$        
3/31/2015 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    29,465,453          (142,230)$           29,323,223          29,323,223          29,323,223$        
6/30/2015 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    15,477,824          (108,639)$           15,369,186          15,369,186          15,369,186$        
9/30/2015 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    27,975,257          (66,792)$             27,908,465          27,908,465          27,908,465$        
12/31/2015 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    13,987,628          (33,357)$             13,954,272          13,954,272          13,954,272$        
3/31/2016 -$            -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    -$                    13,325,319          -$                    13,325,319          13,325,319          13,325,319$        
Total (138,000,000)$  69,225,000$      (69,225,000)$    (11,781,000)$    (150,000,000)$  230,943,817$   (5,003,240)$      225,940,577$   
IRR 14.91%
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GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
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Minimum Capital Commitment: $5,000,000
The Fund
• Mezzanine Debt Fund
– Offering $150 million LP Interests
– Minimum Commitment: $5,000,000
– Minimum investor return of 14%
– Qualified Investors
GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
The Target Market
• Target existing commercial assets with 
maturing mortgages
– More restrictive first mortgage lending 
requirements
– Declining property values
• Investing in Washington, D.C. region
GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
The Sponsor
• GRW Mezz GP LLC (GP of the Fund)
– GRW Funds, Inc. (Managing Member)
• Direct Fund investments
• Investor relations
– Fox Realty Mezz Investments L.P. (Member)
• Affiliate of Fox Realty Trust (S&P 500)
• Guarantor capacity (step-in-the-shoes; bridge loan)
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GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
Strategy - Overview
• Issue mezzanine debt to assist borrowers 
seeking to refinance
– Positive leverage still possible
• Low interest rates and increasing cap rates
• Bridge Loan – defer investor capital
• Clear Investment Criteria
• Focused Sponsor Approach – investor control
• Low Sponsor Management Fees
GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
Strategy - Opportunities
• Loan Maturities 2009 - 2011





GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
Strategy – Investment Criteria
• Washington, D.C. Region
• 80% Loan To Value Maximum
• Existing Assets
• Individual Mezz Loan – Max of 10%
• In-Place Income
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GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
Strategy – Sponsor Approach
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Calendar Year Mgmt Fee
2009 77,330$              
2010 617,535$            
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• Management Fee
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• Loan Extensions – “Money Good”?
• Recapitalization
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Stabilized NOI 13.3$   Stabilized NOI 14.7$    
Cap Rate 10% Cap Rate 10%




























Pure LTV Gap Scenario
GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
Flow of Funds
Maturing Loan Balance (100.00)$      
New Senior Loan 88.37           
New Mezz Loan 14.73           
GP Cash from Refinancing 3.10$            
Revalued Capital Stack
Revalued Asset 147.28$        
New Senior Loan 88.37           60%
New Mezz Loan 14.73           10%
Refinanced Equity in 44.18$          30%
Cash Flow
2009 NOI 14.73$          
Less Debt Service
1st Mortgage (7.75%) (8.10)            
GRW Mezz Debt (14%) (2.21)            
Free and Clear Cash 4.42$            
GP Cash on Cash Return 10.00%
WACC (w/ Constants) 10.00%
• Value increased by 
$14M
• 1st mortgage proceeds 
reduced by $12M
• GP takes $3M out on 
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Stabilized NOI 9.3$     Stabilized NOI 10.3$    
Cap Rate 7% Cap Rate 10%
















$20M - 15% LTV
GP - $13M - 10% LTV
90% GP
$21M - 20% LTV
GRW Mezzanine Debt




7.75% - 10 yr
Distressed CMBS Scenario
GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
Flow of Funds
Maturing Loan Balance (100.00)$      
New Senior Loan 61.83           
New Mezz Loan 20.00           
GP New Equity Investment 21.22           
XYZ Mezzanine Walk-away Funds 3.05$            
Revalued Capital Stack
Revalued Asset 103.05$        
New Senior Loan 61.83           60%
New Mezz Loan 20.00           19%
Refinanced Equity in 21.22$          21%
Cash Flow
2009 NOI 10.30$          
Less Debt Service
1st Mortgage (7.75%) (5.67)            
GRW Mezz Debt (14%) (3.00)            
Free and Clear Cash 1.64$            
GP Cash on Cash Return 7.71%
WACC (w/ Constants) 10.59%
• GP existing equity 
wiped away
• XYZ Mezz 85% 
write-down
• GP contributes 
additional $20M
• GP accepts 
negative leverage
Distressed CMBS Scenario
GRW MEZZANINE FUND I LP
• GP purchases 
distressed loan at 
$0.80/$1
• GP forecloses out 
existing mezz




Purchase of Distressed Loan (80.00)$      
New Senior Loan 61.83           
New Mezz Loan 20.00           
GP Cash-Out 1.83             
Revalued Capital Stack
Revalued Asset 103.05$        
New Senior Loan 61.83           60%
New Mezz Loan 20.00           19%
Refinanced Equity in 21.22$          21%
Cash Flow
2009 NOI 10.30$          
Less Debt Service
1st Mortgage (7.75%) (5.67)            
GRW Mezz Debt (14%) (3.00)            
Free and Clear Cash 1.64$            
GP Cash on Cash Return 7.71%
WACC (w/ Constants) 10.59%
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